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Under-Explored Corners: Inherent Executive
Power in the Irish Constitutional Order
Conor Casey*
Abstract-It has been suggested that it may be surprising to some that after 80 years
one could claim that Bunreacht na hiireann has some significant 'under-explored
corners. It may be added to this claim that some under-explored corners are perhaps
more surprising than others. Article 28.2 of the Constitution provides that 'the executive
power of the State shall, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, be exercised by
or on authority of the Government'. However, as a matter of Irish law, the parameters of
executive power in the domestic sphere is an area lacking detailed examination. This has
led to an under-exploration of a key branch of State, indeed, the most powerful branch
of the Irish State given that it is frequently perceived to dominate the legislature. This
paper seeks to explore this corner of the Irish constitutional order, examining the rich
history, precedents, and principles which constitute this fascinating, if rarely examined,
aspect of our basic law.
Part I of this article begins by briefly considering the different conceptual frameworks
that may be used to discern an inherent executive power in the Irish constitutional order.
In Part II I consider examples of such powers expressly identified by the courts. These
include the power to regulate immigration, the power to establish tribunals in the public
interest, and the power to create non-statutory policy schemes. In Part Ill, I analyse the
relatively limited number of authorities examining exercises of non-statutory executive
power in the domestic sphere, and set out observations which can be drawn from their
academic and judicial treatment. I suggest that a consensus of sorts has been reached
on the issue of non-statutory exercises of executive power in the absence of legislation.
This section includes a detailed analysis of the core principles of this emerging consen-
sus, and discussion of their long history in Anglo-American legal thought. This section
also suggests these principles are discernible in the drafting history of the Constitution
and in the recent case law of the courts. In Part IV I distil the core principles of the juris-
prudence discussed in detail in Part Ill. Then, having outlined the basic contours of
domestic executive powers jurisprudence, I conclude by identifying what I consider the
difficult and fascinating unresolved questions posed by this emerging body of case law.
Ultimately, I hope to demonstrate that after 80 years Bunreachtna hFireann indeed
remains a document filled with fascinating under-explored corners - even in respect of
fundamental questions of constitutional law.
* LLB (Dubl) LLM (Yale). The author would like to thank Aisling Murray, Daire
McCormack-George, and Gerry Whyte for reading earlier drafts. The author would
also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.
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Introduction
It has been suggested that it may be surprising to some that after 80 years
one could claim that Bunreacht na hiireann has some significant 'under-
explored corners" It may be added to this claim that some under-explored
corners are perhaps more surprising than others. Article 28.2 of the
Constitution provides that 'the executive power of the State shall, subject
to the provisions of this Constitution, be exercised by or on authority of the
Government'. However, as a matter of Irish law, the parameters of executive
power in the domestic sphere is an area lacking detailed examination. 2 This
has led to an under-exploration of a key branch of State, indeed, the most
powerful branch of the Irish State given that it is frequently perceived to
dominate the legislature.
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the paucity of judicial and academic com-
mentary on the precise nature of the executive power vested in the govern-
ment is often ascribed to the extremely close relationship it enjoys with the
legislative branch. O'Donnell J, writing extra-judicially, notes that as a matter
of Irish law the pattern of executive control being exercised predominantly
through legislation reflects the stark reality that the executive branch recog-
nises that parliament poses no real threat to it.3 Consequently, the government
1. Darren O'Donovan, 'Executive Power and Fundamental Rights: Unexplored
Constitutional Terrain?' Human Rights in Ireland <http://humanrights.ie/constitution-
of-ireland/executive-power-and-fundamental-rights-underexplored-constitutional-
terrain/> accessed 6 May 2016.
2. This has been recognised by some members of the superior courts. In Conway v
Ireland [2017] IESC 13 Clarke J remarked obiter at para 2.2 that: 'the separation
of powers between the Government and the Oireachtas has, perhaps, been less
explored in Irish constitutional litigation than the separation of powers between
the courts, on the one hand, and the Government or the Oireachtas, on the other.
However, Clarke J went on to suggest that: 'nonetheless the division of responsi-
bilities between Government and Oireachtas in the particular way in which that
division is specified in the Irish Constitution forms an important part of the Irish
constitutional architecture'.
3. The Hon Mr Justice Donal O'Donnell,'Some Reflections on the Independence of the
Judiciary in Ireland in 21st Century Europe'of (2016) Trinity College Law Review 1, 10.
It remains to be seen whether this sentence deserves qualification in the aftermath
of the February 2016 elections for the 32nd DAil, where no party managed to success-
fully gain a majority. An agreement was finally reached, between the two largest par-
ties, for a Fine Gael-led minority government on 29 April, 63 days after the election,
and the DAil formally re-elected Enda Kenny as Taoiseach on 6 May. As Alan Greene
has recently commented:'The ambiguous outcome of the general election has been
heralded as an opportunity for a new politics to emerge in Ireland. DAil reform to
deal with this new reality has featured highly in the news cycle as no longer can the
Government dominate the legislative agenda and expect all its bills to be enacted.
Similarly, it can no longer expect to be able to veto opposition legislation or oppo-
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is not often required to assert an inherent executive power to promulgate a
desired rule or policy in a non-statutory fashion.4 Casey similarly writes that the
executive, by invariably enjoying a parliamentary majoritys can reliably equip
itself by statute with'any new powers it may consider necessary: He notes that
it is primarily from statute that the 'executive derives the executive powers it
nowadays wields 6 In these circumstances the executive, usually through a
Minister, is often vested with the exercise of discretionary administrative power
conferred by statute as a person designate.7 There is ample case law discussing
the constraints on this exercise of power.' Similarly, there is a sizeable corpus of
case law and accompanying academic commentary discussing the difficulties
inherent in establishing the boundaries between the legislature's constitution-
ally permissible ability to delegate the power to promulgate subordinate reg-
ulation, which is often entrusted to a Minister, and the absolute constitutional
prohibition on delegated law-making authority.' However, and perhaps for
the reasons touched on by Casey and O'Donnell, there are considerably fewer
cases dealing with executive power more generally, particularly where this is
sition tabled amendments to Government bills': Alan Greene,'Minority Government,
Human Rights, and the Opportunity for Constitutional Dialogue' Human Rights
in Ireland <http://humanrights.ie/constitution-of-ireland/minority-government-
human-rights-and-the-opportunity-for-constitutional-dialogue/> accessed 9 May
2016.
4. The Hon Mr Justice Donal O'Donnell,'Some Reflections on the Independence of
the Judiciary in Ireland in 21st Century Europe'(2016) Trinity College Law Review 1,
10-11.
5. James Casey, ConstitutionalLawin Ireland, (3rd ed Round Hall 2000), at 231.
6. ibid. Similar sentiments have been expressed by O'Donovan and Donson, who
observe that'Given the fused nature of the executive-legislative power in Ireland, the
ability of the executive to equip itself of power through parliament has led to a pau-
city of case law defining the executive branch' Fiona Donson and Darren O'Donovan,
Law and Public Administration in Ireland (Clarus Press 2015).
7. Examples include the statutory power to grant permission to land or be in the State
under s 4 of the Immigration Act 2004, or to order a deportation under s 3 of the
Immigration Act 1999.
8. For example, the requirement that administrative discretion be exercised with due
regard to fair procedures, reasonablenessand latterly, proportionality. Moreover, acts
of administrative discretion must be exercised in accordance with s 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. Acts of administrative discretion must also
comply with the obligations of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights
when a Member State is implementing Union law.
9. As noted by O'Donnell J in McGowan v Labour Court [2013] IESC 21:'If in truth any
piece of regulation amounted to truly delegated legislation, it would offend Article
15, since it is plain from the very language thereof, and indeed the constitutional
structure, that the function of legislation is one that cannot be delegated by the
Oireachtas to any other body.
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exercised without any statutory basis based on an assertion of non-statutory
inherent executive power.10
Outline of Article
Part I of this article briefly considers different conceptual frameworks that
may be used to discern an inherent executive power in the Irish constitutional
order. In Part IIl consider examples of such powers expressly identified by the
courts. These include the power to regulate immigration, the power to estab-
lish tribunals in the public interest, and the power to create non-statutory
policy schemes. In Part Ill, I analyse the relatively limited number of authori-
ties examining exercises of non-statutory executive power in the domestic
sphere, and set out observations which can be drawn from their academic
and judicial treatment. I suggest that a consensus of sorts has been reached
on the issue of non-statutory exercises of executive power in the absence of
legislation.This section includes a detailed analysis of the core principles of this
emerging consensus, and discussion of their long history in Anglo-American
legal thought. This section also suggests these principles are discernible in the
drafting history of the constitution and in the recent case law of the courts.
In Part IV I distil the core principles of the jurisprudence discussed in detail in
Part Ill. Then, having outlined the basic contours of domestic executive powers
jurisprudence, I conclude by identifying what I consider the difficult unresolved
questions posed by this emerging body of case law.
Reasons for Analysis
The answers to these questions are, I propose, not simply of academic interest.
Given the core connection of the notion of separating powers to central dem-
ocratic values, it is of considerable importance that the contours of each gov-
ernmental branch be assessed and critically scrutinised.11 Careful attention to
the powers each branch can wield is not just imperative in a presidential system
10. In contrast, there is at least one area of the executive's few explicitly enumerated
constitutional powers which has attracted considerablejudicial and academic atten-
tion; namely the conferral of the government with the power to conduct the foreign
affairs of the State. This power, one of few examples of executive power explicitly
vested in the government by constitutional text, has generated a number of land-
mark cases such as Crotty vAn Taoiseach [1987] IR 713 and Pringle v Ireland [2012]
IESC 47. This article, however, is concerned with the lesser-examined aspects of
executive power in the domestic sphere.
11. Richard Albert notes that constitutional scholars generally argue that the separation
of powers advances one or more of the following values: (1) guarding against gov-
ernment tyranny, (2) defending against legislative supremacy, (3) preventing arbi-
trary government, and (4) promoting governmental efficiency. See Richard Albert,
'Presidential Values in Parliamentary Democracies' (2010) 8(2) International Journal
of Constitutional Law 207-236.
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where the executive and legislature are separately elected, but also in systems
where the executive and legislature are often fused, as can be generally said of
parliamentary models. Critiques of traditional formalist separation of powers
doctrine advanced by Irish scholars such as Carolan, Daly, and Hickey all correctly
observe that the text of the Constitution belies the extent to which the executive
in practice dominates the legislature. The text of the Constitution simply does
not speak to the key role played by the existence of centralised, disciplined, and
whipped political parties in the exercise of constitutional power between the
government and parliament. The reality of the fact that many parliamentary
deputies owe their primary allegiance to a centralised political party necessar-
ily undermines the ability of parliament to supervise, censure, and obstruct the
executive.12 The rhetoric of tripartite separation of powers then often serves to
merely obfuscate the lived constitutional fact of strong executive dominance."
However, I do not think that the foregoing renders exploration of the prin-
ciples demarcating the executive's inherent non-statutory power redundant.
As Albert notes, while a Westminster-style parliamentary system like Ireland
may fuse 'executive and legislative personnel, it retains a separation of execu-
tive and legislative functions inasmuch as the'executive must retain the confi-
dence of the legislature, which must, in turn, approve the executive's plan for
governing.14 Without a satisfactory conception and understanding of the con-
stitutional boundaries of inherent executive power, even this somewhat lim-
ited check on the executive branch may be weakened.This could occur through
government reliance on a broad conception of inherent executive power to
justify regulation of areas of policy without seeking parliamentary approval in
the first place, therefore bypassing legislative scrutiny entirely." There are a few
reasons why an executive may attempt to rely on an inherent non-statutory
power rather than attempt to implement a policy through statute. Margit Cohn
observes that governments are often likely to prefer non-statutory powers to
legislation, as informal rule making:
bypasses the arduous legislative process that provides potential entry-points for
interest groups and other participants in the public sphere. Non-statutory rules,
independently formed by the executives, are both more pliable and amenable
12. Eoin Carolan, The New Separation of Powers: A Theory for the Modern State (Oxford
University Press 2003), at 40.
13. Daly and Hickey suggest that the stark reality is that government dominates the
legislative process to 'an extent that renders parliament close to redundant': Eoin
Daly and Tom Hickey, The Political Theory of the Irish Constitution: Republicanism and
the Basic Law (Manchester University Press 2015), at 105.
14. The text of the Constitution places this express duty on DAil ireann, through Article
28.4.1, which states that the'Government shall be responsible to DAil ireann.
15. Margit Cohn,'Non-Statutory Executive Powers: Assessing Global Constitutionalism
in a Structural-Institutional Context' (2015) 64 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 65, 70.
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to further change by the same informal measures. Once instated, an unwritten
arrangement could be more elusive, rendering review and other modes of
accountability more difficult to maintain. 16
From the perspective of the government, another clear benefit of circumvent-
ing the legislative process entirely is that Irish courts have traditionally exercised
considerable deference when reviewing the constitutionality of non-statutory
executive power. Unlike legislative interference with constitutional rights, which
is subject to the Heaney proportionality test, non-statutory exercises of execu-
tive power will only be struck down if they involve a 'clear disregard'of consti-
tutional rights.17The latter is a manifestly much more difficult threshold to meet
for a litigant attempting to challenge a government policy. Thus, the impor-
tance of understanding the boundaries of each branch is important in the Irish
constitutional order as even in a fused system the legislature can continue to
act as a forum of contestation, and provide a measure of oversight vis-a-vis the
executive, even if not in an overly robust manner. Aside from concerns relating
to the further exacerbation of executive dominance, I believe that the case law
below exhibits that policies and rules promulgated by the executive are poten-
tially just as capable of affecting rights and interests as decisions made under
legislation, providing more reason to subject the purported exercise of execu-
tive power to careful analysis.
Part 1. Defining Inherent Executive Powers
Perhaps the most prominent difficulty in defining whether something con-
stitutes an executive power is that very few are textually enumerated in the
Constitution. Article 28.2 states rather baldly that 'the executive power' of the
State shall be exercised by or on the authority of the government. As has been
observed, there is simply very little textual guidance as to what executive power
in the Irish constitutional order consists of.18 A number of approaches have been
16. ibid.
17. See McKenna vAn Taoiseach (No 2) [1995] 2 IR 10 where Hamilton CJ outlined that
judicial intervention in the government's exercise of its executive power would
be done with the utmost caution: '1. The courts have no power, either express or
implied, to supervise or interfere with the exercise by the Government of its execu-
tive functions provided that it acts within the restraints imposed by the Constitution
on the exercise of such powers. 2. If, however, the Government acts otherwise than
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and in clear disregard thereof,
the courts are not only entitled but obliged to intervene. 3. The courts are only enti-
tled to intervene if the circumstances are such as to amount to a clear disregard by
the Government of the powers and duties conferred on it by the Constitution!
18. Oran Doyle, Constitutional Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Clarus Press 2008), at 335.
Margit Cohn observes that 'written constitutional provisions with vaguely drafted
executive power clauses provide a fertile if fuzzy ground for the growth of non-stat-
utory executive powers doctrine' see 'Non-Statutory Executive Powers: Assessing
6 [ 2017
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posited for analysing whether something constitutes an inherent executive
power vested in the government by Bunreacht na hiireann. Morgan posits two
broad approaches, which overlap to some degree. The first, Morgan suggests,
is attractive for its conceptual simplicity and involves subtracting from the total
powers of the State that which is a legislative and judicial power, with the remain-
der being presumptively vested in the executive branch."9 However, the funda-
mental problem Morgan identifies with this framework is that it simply moves
'the difficulty one place on, in that it shifts the problem on to determination of
what is a "power of government"'.2 0 The second approach, which Morgan con-
siders more promising, involves a historical and somewhat originalist enquiry.
This approach considers that if a function has been 'traditionally vested in the
executive arm of government, then it provides warrant for saying that ought to
be regarded as coming within the meaning of phrase'the executive power of
the State'in Article 28.2 as those words would have been understood at the time
of their enactment.2 1 Morgan suggests that assistance for this second position
can be gleaned from consideration of British prerogative powers which were
exercised before the enactment of the 1922 Free State Constitution.22
In relation to the first approach considered by Morgan, Doyle takes the
view that the question of what constitutes a function or power of government
'may be answerable'through considering the powers some organ must have
'in order to be a State'. 23 Doyle gives the example of a rule-making body and an
adjudicative body, and suggests that powers a State must have, in order to be
considered a State, which are neither legislative nor judicial, are presumptively
vested in the executive.24 This approach elides well with taking a historical
approach to discerning the inherent executive powers in Article 28.2, as one's
sense of what powers a State must have to be so called 'will have tradition-
ally been accorded to the State, whether in the form of prerogatives or other-
wise.25 Synthesising these approaches, Doyle puts forward the following broad
framework for ascertaining whether something can be considered an inherent
executive power under the 1937 Constitution:
(a) Is this a power which a State must have in order to be a State?
(b) If so, has the Constitution failed to apply this power explicitly to any other
organ of government?
Global Constitutionalism in a Structural-Institutional Context'(2015) 64 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 65,69.
19. David Gwynn Morgan, The Separation of Powers in the Irish Constitution (Round Hall
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(c) If so and by way of confirmation, is this a power that was traditionally
accorded to the executive arm of the State?26
The next part of this article considers State functions and areas of policy which
have been expressly considered by the courts to fall within the domain of
the government's inherent executive power. Although the courts have not
expressly outlined a test for determining whether a power or function consti-
tutes an inherent executive power, the case law outlined below suggests that
they often implicitly adopt an approach quite like that posited by Doyle.
Part II. Inherent Executive Power in the Irish Constitutional Order
The courts have identified a few areas of policy which they consider to fall
within the remit of inherent executive power, even if they have not been
expressly vested in the government by constitutional text. Most prominent
among these is the power of the executive branch to control the entry and
residence of aliens in the State. However, it is without question that the exec-
utive branch's control of this area of policy has been heavily regulated and
shaped by statutory provision.2 7 Although in each instance of regulation the
Minister for Justice invariably retains a significant amount of statutory dis-
cretion, case law demonstrates that this area of policy can be extensively
colonised by the legislature which can possibly extinguish the ability of the
government to exercise its inherent executive powers. Irish courts appear to
articulate the theoretical basis for ascribing this power to the executive on
something akin to the conceptual framework put forward by Doyle. Thus,
the courts have examined whether (i) the power is one that can be regarded
as a necessary incident of state sovereignty, and (ii) as a matter of histori-
cal practice, whether this power was one previously exercised by the Crown.
The association of the inherent power to regulate immigration with the exec-
utive power of the Crown has a long pedigree.The principle was given judicial
imprimatur in R vBottrill, where the English Court of Appeal held that under
the British constitution the King is:
under no obligation to admit into the United Kingdom, or to retain here when
admitted, any alien. Every alien in the United Kingdom is here only because
his presence has been licensed by the King. It follows that at common law the
King can at will withdraw his licence and cause the Executive to expel the alien,
whether enemy or friend ... one of the rights possessed by the supreme power
in every state is the right to refuse to permit an alien to enter that state, to annex
26. ibid.
27. In the context of entry and residence and removal of EU citizens and their family
members, see Directive 2004/38/EC, as implemented by the European Communities
(Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015. In the context of entry and residence
for non-EEA nationals, see the Immigration Act 2004. In the context of deportation
of non-EEA nationals, see the Immigration Act 1999.
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what conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport
from the state, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers his
presence in the state opposed to its peace, order, and good government, or to its
social or material interests.28
a. Power to Regulate Immigration an Inherent Executive Power
Laurentiu v Minister for Justice29 is perhaps best remembered as one of the rel-
atively few instances where the superior courts have invalidated legislation as
unconstitutional, based on an infringement of Article 15 and its prohibition
of the delegation of legislative power. However, buried in the judgment are
strong dicta supporting the proposition that the inherent power to control
immigration lies with the executive, albeit that this power can be captured by
the Oireachtas and is then consequently subject to the strictures of Article 15.
Denham J and Keane CJ both made interesting obiter comments in respect of
the power of the executive. Denham J (as she then was) observed that'histor-
ically, the control of aliens is for the executive. Aliens are not mentioned in the
Constitution. However, the executive of a state, as an incident of sovereignty,
has power and control over aliensfo Keane CJ also stressed the power of the
executive in this area, noting that it could not be'too strongly emphasised'that
the power to deport aliens was a power of an executive nature 'since it can be
exercised by the executive even in the absence of legislation"' However, Keane
CJ then observed that that was not to say that'its exercise cannot be controlled
by legislation ... any other view would be inconsistent with the exclusive law
making power vested in the Oireachtas.32
Similar views on the broad power of the executive to regulate immigration
were evident in Bode vMinister for Justice, which concerned a special perma-
nent residency scheme administered by the Irish government following a 2004
referendum proposal to change the constitutional rules relating to citizenship.
Following the referendum, people born in the island of Ireland after the con-
stitutional amendment took effect would not have a constitutional right to
be Irish citizens, unless, at the time of their birth, one of their parents was an
Irish citizen or was entitled to be an Irish citizen. To ameliorate the effect of
the change, the government announced revised arrangements for processing
claims from non-national parents of children born in Ireland for permission to
remain in the State. The government opted to do this by way of a non-statu-
tory executive scheme, and invited applications for permission to remain in the
State from non-national parents of Irish-born children before 1 January 2005.
28. [1947] 1 KB 41.
29. [1999] 4 IR 27.
30. ibid.
31. ibid.
32. [1999] 4 IR 27.
33. [2008]3 1R 663.
vol 40(1)] 9
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The Irish courts strongly endorsed the existence of inherent executive power
to control immigration, and for extensive executive discretion in this area.
In the High Court, Finlay Geoghegan J held that the inherent executive power
of the Minister for Justice in relation to aliens included the power to receive,
consider and determine an application for residency or leave to remain in the
State independently of any statutory scheme.34 In the Supreme Court, Denham
J approved of the assertion that in relation to permission to remain and reside,
the State through the executive branch 'must have very wide powers in the
interests of the common good to control aliens, their entry into the state, their
departure and their activities"' Denham J went on to suggest that this power
was both a necessary incident of sovereignty and was traditionally exercised in
Ireland by the executive:
In every State, of whatever model, the State has the power to control the entry, the
residency and the exit of foreign nationals.This power is an aspect of the executive
power to protect the integrity of the State. It has long been recognised that in Ireland
this executive power is exercised by the Minister [forJustice] on behalf of the State.36
The proposition that the State enjoys an inherent executive power to oper-
ate non-statutory administrative schemes for the regulation of aliens in the
absence of a statutory foundation was readily endorsed by the High Court in
CA vMinister for Justice and Equality. 7 MacEochaidh J noted that'the mere fact
that "direct provision" could have been placed on a legislative footing does
not mean that this must happen"' MacEochaidh J expressly referred to Bode
and the operation of the IBC/05 scheme as a prime example of an 'executive
action establishing a scheme without legislative input"' He noted that it was
'significant that the Supreme Court did not find fault with this scheme on the
basis that it was an executive act unsupported by legislation'.4 0 A similarly full-
throated endorsement of the executive's inherent constitutional power to reg-
ulate immigration was given by Clark J in Khalimov v Minister for Justice, who
observed that the Minister for Justice is entrusted with the State's immigra-
tion policy and is entitled to adopt, formulate, tighten or loosen that policy in
34. [2006]l EHC 341.
35. [1986] ILRM 593.
36. [2008] 3 IR 663.
37. [2014] IEHC 532.
38. ibid para 14.25.
39. ibid para 14.30.
40. ibid para 14.30. I have suggested elsewhere that: 'the broader principle that flows
from the Supreme Court's treatment of executive power in Bode, and which was
highlighted by MacEochaidh J is that, in the absence of legislative input the execu-
tive enjoys an inherent and extensive power to regulate in respect of the entry and
residence of aliens. See Conor Casey,'Reading Between the Lines: The Search for the
Legal Basis of Long Term Residency Schemes for Non-Irish Nationals' (2015) 53 The
Irish Jurist (ns) 162-73.
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accordance with the evolving needs of the State as determined by the holder
of that office.4 1 In National Employee Development Training Centre v Minister for
Justice42 Baker J was of the view that the control of immigration 'is an execu-
tive function and the courts have long recognised the power of the State to
regulate immigration and to establish its boundaries. 43 Baker J approved its
description as an'antecedent and inherent power of State ... that has existed
throughout history. 44
Although swathes of areas of immigration law are now regulated by statute,
interesting questions remain about the scope of the executive power to control
the entry and residence of aliens in the State, particularly in light of the pow-
erful endorsement of inherent executive power outlined in the above authori-
ties. For example, while control over issuing visas undoubtedly remains an area
regulated pursuant to inherent executive power,45 in other spheres of immi-
gration law there is a lack of clarity concerning the extent to which legislative
regulation has effectively pre-empted the executive's inherent power. There is
evident uncertainty in the superior courts concerning the interaction between
the Immigration Act 2004 and the executive power of the State to operate and
regulate residency permission schemes for third-country nationals; particularly
the question of whether the former has pre-empted the latter. Many judges on
the High Court appear to think this is the case.4 6 In contrast, the Supreme Court
has not yet definitively ruled on the interaction between ss 447 and 548 of the
41. [2010] IEHC 91, para 19. Clark J continued to observe that the Minister is entitled to
require that applicants meet certain criteria in order to obtain permission to enter
and remain in the State. If those criteria are not met then it follows that the Minister
is entitled to reject such an application.
42. [2015] IEHC 140, para 23.
43. ibid.
44. ibid.
45. In R v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2009] IEHC 279, para 25:'It
is clear that the Minister is under no legal obligation to grant a visa - the grant
or refusal of visas is entirely within his discretion and it is for the visa applicant to
convince the Minister that he or she should be granted a visa. Government policy
determines which foreign nationals require visas to visit or transit the State and
whether they can work in the State. The inherent executive power and responsibility
of the Government to formulate immigration policy is supplemented by statutory
provisions including the Aliens Act 1935 and the Immigration Acts 1999, 2003 and
2004. There is at present no statutory framework for issuing visas.'
46. See Saleem vMinister forJustice [2011] IEHC 223, O'Leary vMinister forJustice [2012]
IEHC 80 and Hussein v Minister for Justice andEquality [2013] IEHC 27.
47. s 4(1) states: 'Subject to the provisions of this Act, an immigration officer may, on
behalf of the Minister, give to a non-national a document, or place on his or her
passport or other equivalent document an inscription, authorising the non-national
to land or be in the State (referred to in this Act as"a permission").
48. s 5(1): 'No non-national may be in the State other than in accordance with the
terms of any permission given to him or her before the passing of this Act, or a
vol 40(1)] 11
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Immigration Act 2004 and inherent executive power. Although the Supreme
Court has expressly not answered the question of whether an inherent power
to grant entry and residence to non-EEA nationals remains, there is obiter dicta
to suggest that the Supreme Court has adopted the premise that the Minister
for Justice has inherent power to consider and determine an application for
residency that is independent of any statutory scheme.49
b. Power to Establish Tribunals of Inquiry in Public Interest
The regulation of the entry and residence of aliens is not the only inherent
executive power explicitly recognised by the superior courts. In Goodman
International v Hamilton5 0 the court recognised that the executive power in
Article 28 encompasses the ability to establish tribunals of inquiry in the public
interest. In a similar manner to the power to control immigration, the author-
ity to hold public tribunals of inquiry in the public interest has also been rec-
ognised as an inherent executive power of the Crown.51 In Goodman the court
considered inter alia constitutional issues relating to the establishment of a
Tribunal of Inquiry into alleged wrongdoing in the beef-processing industry.
Costello J observed that there was no statutory provision which empowered
the establishment of the Tribunal either by the two Houses or the Minister, but
that the 'Government or any Minister can inquire into matters of public inter-
est as part of the exercise of its executive powers: Similarly, in Gama, Finlay
Geoghegan J noted that a tribunal of inquiry may be created under statute, or
established as an exercise of the executive power of the State. Both Costello 52
permission given under this Act after such passing, by or on behalf of the Minister.
(2) A non-national who is in the State in contravention of subsection (1) is for all
purposes unlawfully present in the State.'
49. In Hussein vMinister forJustice [2015] IESC 104, one of the points of law certified
for the Supreme Court was whether the Minister for Justice retains an executive
power notwithstanding the provisions of ss 4 and 5 of the Immigration Act 2004,
to operate schemes for the grant of permission to be or remain in the State which
are not subject to the said provisions. Counsel for the State noted that they were
not in a position to argue this point, which the court described as one'of difficulty
and significance, which might perhaps be dispositive in another case. The court
observed that'accordingly ... the court did not, therefore, address the question of
the existence or continued existence of any inherent executive power in the rele-
vant area, or of the interpretation of s.5 of the Act.'I have suggested previously that
the Supreme Court has hinted in other judgments that the Immigration Act 2004
does not delimit the executive's inherent power to establish residency schemes
for non-EEA nationals.
50. [1992] 2 IR 542.
51. See The Ministry of Justice of the United Kingdom, The Governance of Britain, Review
of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: Final Report (2007) 24-25, 32.
52. Costello J held that'the Government or any Minister can inquire into matters of pub-
lic interest as part of the exercise of its executive powers, but if this is done with-
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and Finlay Geoghegan J suggested that tribunals or commissions established
under a non-statutory assertion of inherent executive power lack the same
powers to compel witnesses and documents as those created under statute.
Similar observations have been made in the UK in respect of the scope of the
royal prerogative in this area.13 As the compelling of witnesses and documents
undoubtedly place obligations and burdens on the legal rights of citizens,
it was considered to require a statutory basis.
c. Non-Statutory Policy Schemes
It is apparent that the superior courts are of the view that the government
can exercise its inherent executive power to establish ex-gratia non-statu-
tory schemes to implement desired policies. Again, this is a power which has
been viewed by some as one of the non-statutory powers of the Crown.5 4 In
CA vMinister forJustice the High Court provided a strong endorsement of this
authority. In CA the applicants sought a declaration that the establishment of
the 'Direct Provision' system of material support for international protection
applicants, and its operation by the Reception and Integration Agency, con-
stituted an impermissible intrusion on the legislative domain. The applicants
argued that the establishment of the Direct Provision scheme constituted, for
all intents and purposes, a legislative measure.The High Court comprehensively
rejected this argument and the proposition that the executive can only act
as mandated by the legislature and cannot create non-statutory policies and
schemes in the absence of a legislative basis. Instead, the court provided a rela-
tively strong endorsement for the exercise of executive power in the absence of
legislation. MacEochaidh J held that:
The Constitution does not require that the legislature must establish principles
and policies in order for the Government to exercise its executive powers.
out reference to parliament then the inquiry will not have statutory powers which
are to be found in the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, and the Tribunals of
Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act 1979.
53. Finlay Geoghegan J referred to the following passage of Professor James Casey's
ConstitutionalLawin Ireland, (3rd ed Round Hall, 2000), at 236:'It is presumably under
its executive power that the Government establishes commissions and committees
to inquire into some subject (e.g. industrial relations, itinerancy, taxation) and report
thereon. Such bodies, of course, function on the basis of evidence voluntarily ten-
dered: and it would not be possible to clothe them with authority to compel the
attendance of witnesses or the production of documents. See also The Ministry of
Justice of the United Kingdom, The Governance of Britain Reviewof the Executive Royal
Prerogative Powers: Final Report (2007) 24-25.
54. For a useful overview of the debate over the appropriate legal basis for these
non-statutory powers in the UK constitutional order: see Margit Cohn, 'Medieval
Chains, Invisible Inks: On Non-Statutory Powers of the Executive' (2005) 25 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 97.
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The Government may exercise executive powers independently of the legislature.
In exercising its constitutional executive powers, the Government may not trespass
upon the exclusive law making function of the legislature. If the Government
establishes a scheme in pursuit of a policy which contains rules and conditions,
though the rules may be regarded as a form of'laws' this would not involve the
executive usurping the law making function of the legislature within the meaning
of Article 15 of the Constitution."
The court did not consider any of the rules or regulations of the Directive
Provision scheme as'laws'within the meaning of Article 15.The court anchored
this conclusion on the premise that the rules created no general burdens, did
not create or reduce personal rights, and were not enforceable by State action.
In the eyes of the court, as the establishment of the scheme was not an exercise
of legislative power nor an attempt by the Oireachtas to delegate said power, the
applicant's reliance on the principles and policies line of case law was fundamen-
tally misplaced. The court characterised the applicant's argument as effectively
limiting the power of the executive branch to 'carrying out instructions of the
legislature'and preventing it pursuing policy that involved rules or restrictions of
any kind.This interpretation of executive power, the court concluded, would neu-
tralise executive power in a'manner which is not intended by the Constitution5 6
The court also firmly rejected the assertion that as the scheme touched upon
fundamental rights it must be subject to legislative control. O'Donovan writes
that the ruling in CA ultimately appears to contemplate that executive policy
'can affect rights, and it is for the individual applicant to prove that a particular
part of the policy constitutes a breach of right protections' 7 Examples of other
executive schemes that have existed/continue to exist without negative com-
ment from the judiciary include:
(i) the system of primary education schooling";
(ii) the IBC/05 residency scheme;
55. [2014] IEHC 532.
56. [2014] IEHC 53, para 14.24.
57. Darren O'Donovan, 'Executive Power and Fundamental Rights: Unexplored
Constitutional Terrain?' Human Rights in Ireland: <http://humanrights.ie/constitu-
tion-of-ireland/executive-power-and-fundamental-rights-underexplored-constitu-
tional-terrain/> accessed 6 May 2016. Oran Doyle and Estelle Feldman similarly note
that, in the court's view, the fact that the scheme amounted to a prima facie infringe-
ment of constitutional rights did not mean that legislation was required. Oran Doyle
and Estelle Freedman, 'Constitutional Law' in Raymond Byrne and William Binchy
(eds), TheAnnual Review of Irish Law (Round Hall 2014), at 151.
58. The court in CA observed that an administrative scheme was used to vindicate a
fundamental constitutional right to primary education for some 80 years from the
foundation of the State until 1998 before it was underpinned by statute. See McCann
v Minister for Education [1997] 1 ILRM 1, 15, where Costello P stated:'In the case of
primary and secondary education, hundreds of millions of pounds are administered
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(iii) a non-statutory scheme reserving a fixed quota of places in medical
school for European citizens;
(iv) the Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal;
(v) the Attorney General's scheme."
In cases concerning these schemes, as in CA, it was a feature of the impugned
measures that the superior courts considered they did not impose general
burdens or reduced personal rights. Indeed, in a number of cases the courts
expressly construed the executive schemes as conferring a benefit on those
who fell within its scope.60 For example, in Bode, the Supreme Court accepted
the State's construction of the scheme as a:
sui generis scheme ... introduced by the Minister, exercising the executive power of
the State, to address in an administrative and generous manner a unique situation
which had occurred in relation to a significant number of foreign nationals within
the State.61
Denham CJ said that the scheme was'a gift, in effect ... an ex-gratia scheme, 62
and that 'an adverse decision under the ... scheme left the applicant in no
annually by means of a large number of administrative measures whose existence
is known only to a handful of officials and specialists, which are not available to the
public and whose effect is uncertain and often ambiguous'
59. The Legal Board describes the scheme as follows:'The Legal Aid - Custody Issues
Scheme (formerly known as the Attorney General's Legal Aid Scheme) provides pay-
ment for legal representation in the High Court and the Supreme Court for certain
types of cases not covered by Civil Legal Aid or the Criminal Legal Aid Scheme. The
cases covered include Habeas Corpus (Article 40.4.2) Applications, High / Supreme
Court Bail Motions, certain types of Judicial Review, Extradition and European Arrest
Warrant Applications (see Paragraph 3 below). It is an ex-gratia scheme set up with
funds made available by the Oireachtas': <http://www.legalaidboard.ie/lab/publish-
ing.nsf/content/LegalAidCustody_1ssuesScheme> accessed 15 May 2016.
60. In Minister forJustice and Equalityv O'Connor [2014] IEHC 640 Edwards J observed of
the scheme'the court completely accepts that the Attorney General's Scheme / the
Legal Aid (Custody Issues) Scheme is not law, that it is non-statutory in origin, and
that it has not otherwise been established by law. It is simply an ad hoc administra-
tive scheme. However, in this court's view there is no requirement for it to be a stat-
utory scheme or otherwise established in law' Its constitutional validity was not the
subject of comment from the judge. In 2009, another extra-statutory scheme was
introduced to vindicate the constitutional right, recognised by the Supreme Court
in Carmody v Minister for Justice [2009] IESC 71, to apply for counsel in relation to
prosecutions in the District Court. Moreover, prior to 1995, the civil legal aid scheme
was an extra-statutory scheme.
61. [2008] 3 IR 663, para 64.
62. [2008] 3 IR 663, para 62. In the High Court decision in Bode Finlay Geoghegan
J observed that the grant of residency or permission to remain in the State for a
period of two years for successful applicants under the IBC/05 scheme is a benefit
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worse position'than he or she was prior to the application as no decision had
been made on any substantive rights.The Chief Justice also observed that such
an arrangement is distinct from circumstances where'legal rights of individuals
may fall to be considered and determined. 63 In State (Hayes) v Criminal Injuries
Compensation Tribunal 64 Finlay P (as he then was) did not appear to have any
reservations concerning the underlying legal basis of the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Tribunal, observing that the'Tribunal was set up by direct exec-
utive act and not as the result of any statutory provision or in pursuance of any
direct statutory power: In a later decision in State (Creedon) v Criminal Injuries
Compensation Tribunal 65 Finlay CJ again expressly referred to the tribunal's lack
of statutory basis without adverse comment, noting that 'it is not of statutory
origin and is set up by an administrative decision by the Government' The con-
stitutionality of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal as an exercise of
executive power was not doubted by the court on either occasion. 66 However,
like the schemes above it was a non-statutory scheme which was considered to
confer a benefit - namely the payment of ex gratia compensation in accordance
with the scheme in respect of personal injury attributable to violent crime.
In the courts' eyes, like in CA and Bode, the scheme did not appear to impose
any general burdens or reduce personal rights.
d. The Royal Prerogatives as a Source of Inherent Executive
Power under Article 28.2
There is a measure of debate whether'the executive power'of the State men-
tioned by Article 28.2 encompasses any of the royal prerogatives vested in the
Crown of England prior to the enactment of the 1922 Free State Constitution,
and the subsequent 1937 Constitution. Broadly speaking, there are two posi-
tions in the debate: (i) the crown prerogatives, to the extent that they are not
repugnant to the 1922 and 1937 Constitutions, are now encompassed by the
inherent executive power of the government; or conversely (ii) the crown
prerogatives are utterly incompatible with provisions in the 1922 and 1937
Constitution affirming the democratic and sovereign nature of the State, and
therefore do not comprise aspects of the executive power vested in the gov-
ernment by Article 28.2. While this article does not propose to enter the debate
for each of the parent applicants, but is also of immediate benefit to the lives of the
citizen child.
63. [2008] 3 IR 663, para 62.
64. [1985] ILRM 210.
65. [1988] 1 IR 51. Similarly, in Minister for Justice and Equality v O'Connor [2014] IEHC
640 the court accepted that the Attorney General's Scheme (a discretionary scheme
providing legal aid to certain types of legal proceedings, including habeas corpus
proceedings)'is not law, that it is non-statutory in origin, and that it has not other-
wise been established by law... but that it did not contravene national law.
66. As noted by MacEochaidh J in CA, para 14.28, the tribunal was'judicially interpreted
and construed in several cases without complaint in this respect being made.
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in any detail, it is arguable that the balance of authority supports the former
position.6 7 Recent judicial authority certainly appears to endorse the former
position, as will be seen below.
In Prendergast Charleton J discussed the relationship between the royal pre-
rogatives vested in the Crown, and the executive power of the State currently
vested in the government under Article 28.2. Charleton J began by colour-
fully observing that the powers of the government are 'obscured by the mists
of time'68 and that whatever powers were exercised by Irish rulers prior to the
Norman conquests were displaced by the rule of the Crown. Charleton J consid-
ered that by reason of the'unwritten nature of those powers, it may be difficult
to define precisely what they ever were.69 A House of Commons public adminis-
tration select committee report on reforming prerogative power made a similar
observation, noting that because of the unwritten nature of those powers it
is difficult to define precisely what they ever were, or currently encompass. 70
However, the committee adopted as a working definition that given by AV
Dicey, who described the royal prerogative as:
the remaining portion of the Crown's original authority, and it is therefore ... the name
for the residue of discretionary power left at any moment in the hands of the Crown,
whether such power be in fact exercised by the King himself or by his Ministers.71
The UK Supreme Court in the recent high profile decision in R (Miller) vSecretary
ofState for Exiting the European Union 72 echoed Dicey, and asserted that the royal
prerogative encompasses the 'residue of powers which remain vested in the
Crown, and they are exercisable by ministers.'7 The court added that over the
centuries these powers'were progressively reduced as Parliamentary democ-
racy and the rule of law developed.7 4 The following prerogative powers were
singled out by the select committee as the most significant still in existence:
a) The making and ratification of treaties.
b) The conduct of diplomacy, including the recognition of states, the rela-
tions (if any) between the United Kingdom and particular Governments,
and the appointment of ambassadors and High Commissioners.
67. For a fascinating overview of the debate over the survival of the royal prerogatives
in Irish law, Laura Cahillane,'The Prerogative and its Survival in Ireland: Dusty Antique
or Positively Useful?'(2010) 1(2) Irish Journal of Legal Studies 1.
68. [2008] IEHC 257, para 51.
69. ibid.
70. House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Taming the Prerogative:
Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament, Fourth Report of Session
2003-04 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmpu-
badm/422/422.pdf> accessed on 16 May 2016.
71. ibid.
72. [2017] UKSC 5.
73. ibid para 47.
74. ibid para 41.
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c) The governance of British overseas territories.
d) The deployment and use of the armed forces overseas, including
involvement in armed conflict, or the declaration of war. (The Royal Navy
is still maintained by virtue of the prerogative; the Army and the RAF are
maintained under statute).
e) The use of the armed forces within the United Kingdom to maintain the
peace in support of the police.
f) The Prime Minister's ability to appoint and remove Ministers, recommend
dissolutions, peerages, and honours (save for the four Orders within
The Queen's own gift), patronage appointments (e.g. in the Church of
England), and the appointment of senior judges.
g) Recommendations for honours by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Secretary and the Defence Secretary;
h) The organisation of the civil service;
i) The grant and revocation of passports;
j) The grant of pardons ... and the Attorney-General's power to stop
prosecutions.
Despite prima facie categorical statements from the Supreme Court in Byrne
v Ireland 7 and Webb v Ireland76 that the enactment of the 1922 Constitution
75. In Byrne vlreland [1972] IR 241 Walsh J held that:'All royal prerogatives to be found
in the common law of England and in the common law of Ireland prior to the enact-
ment of the Constitution of Saorstht ireann, 1922, ceased to be part of the law of
Saorstht ireann because they were based on concepts expressly repudiated by
Article 2 of that Constitution, and therefore, were inconsistent with the provisions of
that Constitution and were not carried over by Article 73 thereof.'
76. In Webb vlreland [1988] IR 353, the Supreme Court approved the comments of Walsh
J in Byrne and expressly spurned to narrow the parameters of the categorical dicta
in Byrne. Finlay CJ held:'I agree with the view reached by the learned trial judge in
this case that on the authority of Byrne v Ireland [1972] I.R. 241 no royal prerogative
in existence prior to the enactment of the Constitution of 1922 was by virtue of the
provisions of that Constitution vested in the Irish Free State. I agree with the judg-
ment of Walsh J in Byrne virelandwhich was expressly concurred in by a majority of
the court that the provisions of article 2 of the Constitution of 1922 declaring the
Irish Free State to be a sovereign State and the provisions of article 51 of the same
Constitution expressly vesting in the King certain executive functions, being the
executive functions of the Irish Free State, are inconsistent with the transference to
that State of any royal prerogative. As is also set out in the decision in Byrne vireland,
it must follow from this conclusion that the royal prerogatives were not prerogatives
exercisable in Saorstht ireann immediately before the 11th December, 1936, and
were therefore not captured by Article 49, s. 1 of the Constitution. It was contended
on this appeal that it was possible to distinguish between a prerogative of immunity
from suit, which was the subject matter of the decision in Byrne v Ireland [1972] I.R.
241 and which could be traced to the royal dignity of the King and a prerogative of
treasure trove which it was stated could be traced or related not to the dignity of
his person but to his position as sovereign or ruler. Such a distinction does not alter
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expelled the prerogatives from Irish law, the view that some traditional crown
prerogatives became part of the inherent executive power of the government
(subject to their compatibility with the Constitution) has attracted consider-
able academic support, and, more recently, cautious judicial reconsideration.
In terms of academic support,JM Kelly, for example, argued trenchantly that the
drafters of both the 1922 and 1937 Irish Constitutions did not intend to expel
the entirety of the prerogatives from Irish law. In doing so, Kelly appealed to a
range of sources, ranging from custom, historical sources, and textual authority:
Summing up my thoughts on the Webb judgment, I would say, then, that the
statutory usage of the Irish Free State, positive and negative, together with the
opinions of judges who played a part in drafting its Constitution, together with
the record of what actually was done in those years in matters such as pardons,
passports, and precedence of counsel, suggest that the Crown and its prerogatives
were understood to have survived into the newly independent Irish state, as part
of the common law, under Article 73, so far as such survival was not ... inconsistent
with some specific dimension of the Constitution."
Similar academic critiques have been advanced by Costello 7 and Hogan and
Whyte.7 1 Put simply, on this view the drafters of the 1922 and 1937 Constitutions
the view which I have expressed with regard to the effect of the provisions of the
Constitution of 1922, and appears to me to ignore the essential point which is that
by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of 1922 what was being created was
a brand new sovereign State and that the function, power or position of the King in
that sovereign State was such only as was vested in him by that Constitution and by
the State created by it'
77. John M Kelly,'Hidden Treasure and the Constitution'(1988) 10 Dublin University Law
Journal 5, 14-15. Kelly added that:'l think that for us today, 50 or 60 years later, to take
the line that our fathers and grandfathers in legal and political and official life quite
misunderstood the nature of the machine they were not only operating but had also
in fact constructed, is to adopt an unreal and intellectually unamiable position'
78. In respect of Article 51 of the Free State Constitution, Costello argues that:'If those
who drafted the Constitution really meant that all of those executive powers,
which, at common law, were rationalised as royal prerogatives did not survive into
the new state, then we also have to be prepared to believe that they were happy to
take state power without even the most elementary executive powers: the power
to engage in foreign relations, to employ civil servants, and institute a civil ser-
vice, to found an army, or make contracts'in'The Expulsion of Prerogative Doctrine
from Irish Law: Quantifying and Remedying the Loss of the Royal Prerogatives'
(1997) 32 Irish Jurist 145, 190-91.
79. Hogan and Whyte implicitly suggest that an original understanding of the 1922 and
1937 constitutions yields the conclusion that their enactment was not intended
to dissolve all prerogatives traditionally exercised by the executive. They note
that:'Some questions would seem to arise on this view, if it is to be understood as
meaning that no dimension whatever of the ancient prerogative survives for the
public benefit ... One might argue, perhaps, that the Government could discharge
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regarded the executive power of the State as encompassing traditional pre-
rogative powers subject to their compatibility with the Constitution. Judicial
authorities discussing the survival of the prerogatives post-Webb appear to
have rowed back in the face of the above critique. For example, Murphy J (in
the High Court) in Geoghegan v Institute of Chartered Finance"0 stated obiter
that he considered that there was no reason in principle that the laws carried
forward by Article 7381 of the 1922 Free State Constitution and Article 5082 of
the 1937 Constitution could not encompass former crown prerogative pow-
ers. He noted that the'filtering process' provided by Article 73 and 50 respec-
tively related to the 'content'of the power and not'its source. 3 This approach
was subsequently endorsed by O'Flaherty J in the Supreme Court decision in
Geoghegan. The Supreme Court reserved its position on whether the parame-
ters of the decisions in Byrne virelandand Webb vlreland had to be'delineated.84
such powers by virtue of the executive powers granted to it by Article 28. The fact
remains, however, that were it not for the very existence of the prerogative in the
first place - and its supposed survival after 1922 - no one would have ever sought
to argue that the Government could have discharged such functions in the absence
of appropriate enabling legislation': Gerard Hogan and Gerry Whyte, John Kelly:
The Irish Constitution, (4th ed Butterworths, Dublin, 2003), at 2115.
80. [1995] 3 IR 86.
81. Subject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not inconsistent
therewith, the laws in force in the Irish Free State (Saorstdt ireann) at the date of
the coming into operation of this Constitution shall continue to be of full force and
effect until the same or any of them shall have been repealed or amended by enact-
ment of the Oireachtas. Kelly observes that this article was understood by O'Byrne
J in State (Kennedy) v Little [1931] IR 39 to have been intended to'set up the new
state with the least possible change in the previously existing law' and in Cork Co
Council and Burke v Commissioners of Public Works [1945] IR 561, and with specific
reference to the royal prerogatives, that said prerogatives had been'part of the com-
mon law, which was applied to the Irish Free State by Article 72. Kelly argues that a
'peculiar authority' must attach to these statements inter alia due to the fact that
O'Byrne J had been a member of the 1922 Free State Constitutional Committee.
Kelly observes that another member of the Constitutional Committee, Murnaghan J,
expressed no dissent at his colleagues'views in Burke. See Kelly'Hidden Treasure and
the Constitution'(1 988) 10 Dublin University Law Journal 5, 10.
82. Subject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not inconsistent
therewith, the laws in force in Saorstht ireann immediately prior to the date of the
coming into operation of this Constitution shall continue to be of full force and effect
until the same or any of them shall have been repealed or amended by enactment of
the Oireachtas.
83. [1995] 3 IR 86.
84. [1995] 3 IR 86, 118. O'Flaherty J held 'it may be that if in a future case a wider
question is raised concerning the royal prerogative, the parameters of the judg-
ments in [Byrne v Ireland and Webb v Ireland] may need to be delineated. Clearly
influenced by the academic critique of those judgments, O'Flaherty J added that
'Doubtless, in any future debate Professor John M. Kelly's essay, Hidden Treasure
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In Prendergast, the most recent decision to explicitly discuss the survival of
the royal prerogatives, Charleton J observed that it may be that only the'royal
aspect'of the prerogatives traceable to the royal dignity of the king, and to his
position as sovereign" that have lapsed, due to their ostensible incompatibility
with the democratic nature of the State, and the Constitution's emphasis on
popular sovereignty. Charleton J, however, explicitly rejected the idea that'the
Government has no residue of inherited powers that are not provided by stat-
ute: Instead he suggested, echoing the above academic critiques, that it would
'not be correct to infer that those who drafted the Constitutions of 1922 and
1937 somehow did not know what they were doing and mistakenly created
a Government without any traditional powers in executive matters." Clark J
in Abuissa v Minister for Justice17 also implicitly suggested that elements of
executive power previously vested in the crown were now exercisable by the
government under Article 28. Clark J considered whether the principle of con-
stitutional justice and concomitant duty to give reasons applied to a decision
of the Minister for Justice to refuse to grant a certificate of naturalisation. Clark
J suggested obiter that whereas constitutional justice applied to all 'legislative'
and 'administrative'acts, it may not apply to what she dubbed 'the prerogative
powers - as opposed to legislative or administrative acts of the State - which
include the power to formulate foreign policy and manage state security'.88
Some former crown prerogatives, such as the ability to conduct the foreign
affairs of the State (which Clark J refers to), are textually vested in the executive
and the Constitution ... which favours a more gradual approach in regard to the
place of the royal prerogative in our constitutional scheme of things, will prove of
immense value.
85. Such as State immunity from suit, and the right to recover treasure trove. Charleton
J cited the dicta of Finlay CJ in Webb vlreland [1988] IR 353, 382, where he asserted
that these lapsed prerogatives could be traced'to the royal dignity of the King ... to
his position as sovereign or ruler.
86. Prendergast v Minister forJustice [2008] IEHC 257, para 52. One potentially interest-
ing and significant prerogative which may now be vested in the executive branch
is the power to deploy the armed forces of the State, subject to the war powers
provision of the Constitution. The fact that this power can be exercised by the gov-
ernment without statutory authorisation was implicitly recognised by Charleton J
in Prendergast, who observed that prior to legislation the executive had 'directed
the civil service, the army and the police force of the State. However, like the power
to regulate immigration, this potential inherent power of the State to deploy the
armed forces abroad is now heavily circumscribed by Ireland's famous "triple lock"
system of authorisation for troop deployment. The triple lock system of authorisa-
tion may represent a double fettering on the inherent executive power of the gov-
ernment to deploy the armed forces abroad, by requiring the assent of Diil ireann
and the UN Security Council or General Assembly. However, the constitutionality of
the triple lock has never been impugned.
87. [2010] IEHC 366.
88. [2010] IEHC 366. My emphasis.
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branch under the Constitution. Other traditional prerogatives, such as the
power to control and regulate immigration, to hold tribunals of inquiry, and to
create ex-gratia policy schemes have been recognised by the courts to consti-
tute inherent executive powers. If the position of Charleton J is followed in the
Supreme Court, then the prerogatives traditionally vested in the executive prior
to the enactment of the Irish Constitution may represent a persuasive source
from which constitutional actors can explore and draw from when attempting
to ascertain potential inherent executive powers which have not yet received
judicial imprimatur. This would also comport well with the framework outlined
by Doyle, which considers recursion to historical practice a legitimate compo-
nent of assessing the breadth of powers encompassed in the sparse text of
Article 28.
Part Ill. Principles Delimiting the Scope of Inherent Executive
Power in the Irish Constitutional Order
a. The Executive Cannot Impose Legal Burdens and Obligations
Absent Statutory Authority
While it is not always necessary for the government to rely on statutory author-
ity to exercise executive authority in the domestic arena, the courts have con-
sistently held that legislation is required before the executive may impose
any legal obligation or burden on citizens. In Gama v Minister for Trade and
Employment" Finlay Geoghegan J approvingly cited a passage from James
Casey's Constitutional Law in Ireland which discussed the limitations of how
executive power may be exercised. The relevant passage states that:
in certain circumstances the constitutional grant of executive power may enable
the Government to act without statutory authority in domestic affairs. It seems
clear however, that it could not without statutory warrant, take action imposing
obligations or burdens on any citizen.90
Similarly, in Prendergast v Minister for Justice Charleton J made a number of
interesting obiter comments outlining a number of specific legal burdens he
considered would be beyond the permissible limits of non-statutory executive
power in the domestic sphere:
Actions of government which have ... the result of imposing a tax; or of
increasing police powers, or similar powers by departmental officials, whereby
people may be arrested or dwellings searched or compelled to undergo
89. [2005]l EHC 210.
90. Casey goes on to venture that the absence of judicial authority on this point'doubt-
less reflects consistent legal advice to the Governments that statutory authority is




interrogation ... are ... outside the realm of any constitutional construction of
powers that are capable of being exercised by the government.91
Writing for the Court of Appeal in Bederevvlreland9 2 Hogan J explicitly linked
this principle both to the Constitution's description of Ireland as a democratic
state and to the normative ideal of the rule of law. Hogan J asserted that the
executive power of the government in Article 28 does not'extend in itself to
taking steps which would have the effect of criminalizing certain conduct or
actions'13 Hogan J anchored this conclusion on the basis that Article 5 makes
clear that the'State is a democracy based on the rule of law'and it followed
that decisions imposing legal burdens like criminalising behaviour and pro-
scribing penalties must'in principle, be either legislative in nature or, if taken
by the executive, have the appropriate legislative foundation'.9 4 Academic
authority, although scarce on this question, broadly agrees with these obser-
vations. Hogan and Whyte, for example, consider that it is not necessary for
the government to rely on statutory authority in order to exercise its execu-
tive power in the domestic arena. They observe that governments have often
done so to create extra-statutory schemes providing benefits for citizens.
However, the authors suggest conversely that legislation is required before
the executive may impose any obligation or burden on citizens." Similarly,
Donson and O'Donovan suggest that generally any executive action that may
affect or alter constitutional and legal rights and interests must be buttressed
with legislative authority.9 6
Thus, the emerging trend from this line of case law appears to be that
the government may execute a non-statutory policy or scheme which
91. [2008] IEHC 257. At para 58 Charleton J observed that executive power has been
used by the government to decide inter alia on the'disbursement of funds in aid of
developing countries; and, in large measure prior to specific enabling legislation, has
directed the civil service, the army and the police force of the State. Now ... there
may be acts providing for those bodies to obey lawful orders, but these are relatively
recent. To organise the civil service and the army and the Gardai, the Government
through its ministers needs to hire people and to dispense with their services. Allof
this affects people's rights and liabilities, sometimes in far-reaching ways' (my emphasis).
However, in an interesting departure from other case law, Charleton J appeared to
disagree with the proposition that executive power could not impose burdens or
obligations in the absence of legislation, although he did not elaborate on this disa-
greement, or on what kinds of burdens and obligations the executive could impose
without legislation.
92. [2015] IECA 38.
93. ibid para 27.
94. ibid.
95. Gerard Hogan and Gerry Whyte, John Kelly: The Irish Constitution, (4th edn
Butterworths 2003), at 429.
96. Fiona Donson and Darren O'Donovan, Law and Public Administration in Ireland
(Clarus Press 2015).
vol 40(1)] 23
Dublin University Law Journal
confers an ex gratia benefit on those within its scope. It also appears that
executive-power-based schemes are constitutionally permissible when they
touch upon, or affect, fundamental rights. However, the courts appear to distin-
guish between an executive scheme merely affecting fundamental rights, and a
scheme which purports to impose any obligation or burden on a citizen's legal
rights, which the balance of authorities suggest is reserved to the legislative
branch exercising its exclusive law-making powers under Article 15.
b. Historical Roots of Constitutional Principle that Executive May Not
Unilaterally Alter Legal Rights and Obligations
It is interesting to note how deeply the foregoing principle runs through
Anglo-American legal history. This principle is also detectable in the Irish
constitutional order both in the text and drafting history of the Constitution
and through the jurisprudence of the courts.1 7 Writing for the United States
Supreme Court, Thomas J recently observed that the idea the executive may
not formulate generally applicable rules of private conduct imposing burdens
or obligations on legal rights has ancient roots, and is embedded in the con-
cept that a ruler must be subject to the law in exercising coercive power and
may not govern by will alone." Thomas J argued that this idea first found
expression in Anglo-American legal thought in early English constitutional
law. It was through principles articulated by both the courts and parliament
that cabined the often-overweening powers of the executive, laying the
foundations underpinning the modern British constitutional order." One
of the most famous and enduringly influential judicial pronouncements on
the extent of executive power remains the judgment of Lord Chief Justice
Coke in the Case of Crown Proclamations. 100 The case itself concerned the
legality of two unilateral proclamations made by James I that purported to
97. In relation to the value of looking at other constitutional systems to better under-
stand the nature of executive power, O'Donovan writes that'It is important to note
that this may also be one area of the Constitution where our common law cousins
seem to have a role. Many colonial constitutions are similar in the way no definition
is supplied. How are we to construe this common heritage? Is there evidence that
the Irish Republic had an expanded version of executive power in mind or should
we look to other jurisdictions'approach to executive power as a floor, particularly
in assessing interactions between executive power and the common law?' Darren
O'Donovan,'Executive Power and Fundamental Rights: Unexplored Constitutional
Terrain?' Human Rights in Ireland <http://humanrights.ie/constitution-of-ireland/
executive-power-and-fundamental-rights-underexplored-constitutional-terrain/>
accessed 6 May 2016.
98. Concurring opinion of Thomas J in Department of Transportation v Association of
American Railroads 575 (US) 2015.
99. Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing 2005), at 68.
100. (1611) 12 Co Rep 74,76 (77 ER 1352).
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have the binding force of law in the same manner as a statute enacted by
parliament. 101 Coke, however, rejected the contention the King enjoyed such
legislative authority. Instead, Coke asserted that under the laws of England
(i) the King could not unilaterally change any part of the common law nor
create new offences by way of proclamation; and (ii) the King enjoyed no pre-
rogative but'that which the law of the land allows him'. 102 Thomas J asserted
that these principles were to have a profound influence on the drafters of the
United States Constitution in relation to their understanding of how the sep-
aration of powers must function, in order to prevent tyrannical government
associated with an executive capable of ruling by ukase.10
Arguably the Irish Courts' interpretation of the permissible limits of
inherent executive power invokes some of the same concerns identified by
Coke and Thomas by requiring that any imposition of burdens and obliga-
tions on the legal rights of persons be imposed by the legislature and not
through executive will. It appears that a common thread running through
each of the constitutional systems of Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States - systems bound by a common legal history - is a deep hos-
tility to the idea of vesting the right of both making and of enforcing the
laws in the same body and permitting the executive to rule by decree. Both
the English and Irish translations of the text of Article 28.2 lend weight to
the distinction between the government's power to execute the law, and the
legislature's exclusive power to impose generally applicable rules of conduct
through 'making laws'. The Irish version of 'executive power' contained in
Article 28.2 states:'Faoi chuimsiu foralacha an Bhunreachta seo, is e an Rialtas
a oibreos, n6 is le hudaras an Rialtais a oibreofar, cumhacht chomhallach an
Stait.'The English version is:'The executive power of the State shall, subject to
the provisions of this Constitution, be exercised by or on the authority of the
Government.'In CA v Minister for Justice the court sought expert evidence on
101. One included a ban on the erection of new buildings in certain parts of London
and the other the making of starch from wheat.
102. Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing 2005), at 71.
103. Prakash observes that'Because colonial Americans were originally members of
the British Empire and spoke the same language as their English brethren, they
naturally shared the same essential meaning of the phrase "executive power."
Notwithstanding the hostilities with the mother country, this understanding
was not a casualty of war. Rather, Americans of all sorts employed "executive
power" exactly as had the theorists. In fact, such was the theorists' influence
that Americans not only shared the same definitions, they also voiced the same
fears, particularly the apprehensions about uniting the powers of government':
Saikrishna Prakash,'The Essential Meaning of Executive Power' (2003) University
of Illinois Law Review 701, 753.
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the nature of the similarities and differences between the two texts. The court
accepted the evidence presented through affidavitl 04 that:
the sense of the Irish verb comhaill, on which the comhallach is based, would appear
to correspond to the sense of the English verb 'execute' on which the adjective
'executive' is based ... In Dineen's 1934 Irish-English Dictionary, for the form of the
first person singular of the verb, comhallaim, Dineen gives 'I fulfil or accomplish,
discharge an office. The word 'execution' is included in that Dictionary among the
senses of the related noun form, comhall-'act of fulfilling; covenant, performance,
execution, fulfilment; act, deed' ... For the related adjectival form, c6mhaltach,
Dineen has the senses 'fulfilling, fulfilled, keeping promises, contracts, etc' Dineen
gives c6mhallach as another form of that head word c6mhaltach.
The court concluded that it was satisfied there is no difference in meaning
between the phrases'executive power of the State'and'cumhacht chomhallach
an Stait'in Article 28.2 of the Constitution. Read in light of the absolutist terms
of Article 15.2, it is apparent that the drafters of the Irish Constitution did not
intend to depart from the deeply entrenched Anglo-American constitutional
principle that there ought to be a strong demarcation between those vested
with the power of making laws, and those entrusted with their faithful 'fulfil-
ment' and 'execution: However, this is not to say that the drafters wished to
create an emasculated executive. There is no doubt that while de Valera was
a democrat, and someone sufficiently committed to the notion of fundamen-
tal rights that he would entrench them in a bill of rights, 10s he undoubtedly
'believed in strong government.1 06 Unlike the drafting process of the 1922
Constitution, there was no real discussion of crafting mechanisms (such as the
'extern ministers' proposal) which might be used to 'counteract or stem the
104. By Dr MicheM1 0 Cearuil, author of Bunreachtna hFireann:A Study of the Irish Text
(Oifig an tSoldthar 1999).
105. That the rights provisions in the Constitution were considered fundamental is not
only evident from constitutional text, but from the drafting and ratification history
of the document. At the beginning of the ratification debates on the draft constitu-
tion Camon de Valera outlined his vision for the Constitution in a radio broadcast:
'A Constitution ought to do more than define the character of the legislative, exec-
utive and judicial regime, and if it be based on the democratic principle, it ought
to do more, for example, than prescribe how the representative institutions are to
function ... Every citizen should see in the basic public law of his country the sure
safeguard of his individual rights as a human being - God-given rights which even
the civil power must not invade. The protection of those rights means more in the
long run to the integrity and continuance of organized society than the organ-
ization of the institutions by which it is ruled': Gerard Hogan, Origins of the Irish
Constitution, 1928-1947 (Royal Irish Academy 2012), at 535.
106. Eoin Daly and Tom Hickey, The Political Theory of the Irish Constitution: Republicanism
and the BasicLaw (Manchester University Press 2015), at 96.
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problem of executive dominance' of parliament. 07 Moreover, the drafting his-
tory suggests that some members of the drafting committee were indeed advo-
cates of robust executive authority. Stephen Roche from the Department of
Justice'08 was a particularly vociferous critic of constraining executive and leg-
islative power through judicial review, and expressed 'serious concerns about
the potential for judicial activism which the new Constitution would afford'.10"
As a member of the 1934 constitution review committee Roche asserted that
what the country wanted 'at present and probably will continue to want for
many years is a strong Executive' that would not be 'delayed, hampered and
humiliated at every step by long arguments in the courts.1 10 At a later stage in
the drafting process, in a lengthy memorandum prepared on the draft constitu-
tion in March 1937, Roche expressed considerable hostility to'the whole idea of
tying up the Diil and the Government with all sorts of restrictions and putting
the Supreme Court like a watch-dog over them for fear they may run wild and
do all sorts of indefensible things."" Roche also suggested that the rights pro-
visions of the Constitution:
went into too much detail ... the ... shorter and more general the Constitution is
the less likely it is that the maintenance of law and order will likely be impeded by
limitations on the power of the Diil and by conflicts between the judiciary and the
executive.1 12
However, such views were not unanimous. For example, Michael McDunphy, an
Assistant Secretary in de Valera's department, commented on his copy of the
1934 Roche memo that a'strong executive'could be a'real danger'as opposed
to a blessing for the fledgling constitutional order.' 13 Roche's observations must
also be read in light of evidence suggesting that the drafters were keenly aware
of the dangers of executive law-making, and quite content that the vesting of
sole and exclusive law making power in the Oireachtas encompassed a rigorous
demarcation between law-making and their execution. A memorandum pre-
pared by George Gavan Duffy 14 on the second revised draft of the Constitution
for the Attorney General's Office, dated 11 April 1937, queried whether the
fact the Oireachtas was to have 'sole and exclusive' law-making authority
ensured that the lawful status of statutory orders and bye-laws were in doubt.
107. ibid.
108. Stephen Roche, Secretary of the Department of Justice (1934-49).






114. Barrister, Member of the Irish Treaty Delegation, Judge and later President of the
High Court.
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Gavan Duffy proceeded to suggest a saving clause to expressly permit the
'delegation of legislative power by the Oireachtas for the purpose of carrying
laws into effect."" In response to this memorandum Philip O'Donoghuell6 pre-
pared a minute for the Attorney General' 17 which made interesting comments
regarding the intent and purpose of Article 15. O'Donoghue argued that the
addition of a saving clause to the Article would take away from the sole and
exclusive law-making power of the Oireachtas and 'lend support to the view
that Ministers and Departments can also legislate in respect of certain mat-
ters."18 O'Donoghue stated that this'would be mischievous'and that'very little
consideration will indicate the abuses which would grow up if the legislature
contended itself with enacting loose and indefinite principles, adding that the
Minister could give effect to such principles by rules and regulations" 19 He then
proceeded to argue that Article 15 required that principles of legislation must be
definitely enacted in the statute, and that while rules and orders may prioritise
matters such as'form, time and manner'of carrying into effect the objects of the
statute, a rule that sought to 'depart from the scope of the statute, impose new
obligations or confer new rights ... could be properly set aside by the courts.120
The Attorney General subsequently thoroughly agreed with the opinion of
O'Donoghue.12 1 It is apparent, then, that the framers of the Constitution were
attuned to the mischief of executive law-making, and were emphatically satis-
fied that the terms of Article 15 did not provide any avenue for the government
to exercise such a power. Although they wished to create a strong executive, it
appears they envisaged the government would have to achieve its desired pol-
icy ends through the legislative process, by maintaining a strong majority and
holding the confidence of the legislature.
c. The Executive May Not Abrogate or Suspend Legislation
Another brake on the exercise of executive power in the domestic sphere stems
from the principle that it may not be used to unilaterally abrogate a statute.
Where the Oireachtas has legislated to regulate an area of policy, it effectively
pre-empts the ability of the executive to create policies or schemes which
purport to suspend or disapply the statute. Again, this principle has a long
pedigree in Anglo-American legal history.In Attorney GeneralvDeKeyser'sRoyal
115. Gerard Hogan, Origins of the Irish Constitution, 1928-1947 (Royal Irish Academy
2012), at 459.
116. 1896-1987, Barrister, Legal Assistant to the Attorney General, later Judge on the
European Court of Human Rights.
117. 1866-1947, Patrick Lynch, Barrister, Attorney General 1936-1940.
118. Gerard Hogan, Origins of the Irish Constitution, 1928-1947 (Royal Irish Academy
2012), at 480.
119. ibid.




Hotel Ltd1 22 the House of Lords held that it was a fundamental principle of the
UK legal order that a statute could occupy and displace a power previously vested
in the executive. In the context of the executive's power to take a subject's prop-
erty during war and emergency situations the House of Lords stated that:
The constitutional principle is that when the power of the Executive to interfere
with the property or liberty of subjects has been placed under Parliamentary
control, and directly regulated by statute, the Executive no longer derives its
authority from the Royal Prerogative of the Crown but from Parliament, and that
in exercising such authority the Executive is bound to observe the restrictions which
Parliament has imposed in favour of the subject.123
The very recent 'Brexit' litigation provided an extraordinarily high-profile
example of the UK courts giving a full-throated reiteration of this fundamental
precept. In R vMiller1 24 the Supreme Court observed that while the Crown's tra-
ditional executive powers are now exercised by the Prime Minister and cabinet,
consistently with the'principles established in the 17th century, the exercise of
those powers must be compatible with legislation and the common law: The
court noted that if it were otherwise 'ministers would be changing (or infring-
ing) the law, which ... they cannot do.125 In several relatively recent cases, Hogan
J has consistently emphasised that this constraint on executive power is a prin-
ciple recognised in the Irish constitutional order. In MacDonncha v Minister for
Education1 26 the court held that statutory positions held by the applicants pur-
suant to legislation already enacted by the Oireachtas could not be dismantled,
nor the statutory entitlements of those officer-holders compromised merely
by executive action or by directions given on behalf of the executive. Hogan J
observed that it is the constitutionally vested power of the Oireachtas alone to
'both make and unmake law'and that the government enjoys'no right to sus-
pend or to disapply the law, for if such a power were to be allowed, it would be
tantamount to saying that the Government could in effect secure a repeal of the
law without the necessity of legislation.127 Hogan J made similar observations in
122. [1920] AC 508.
123. ibid (my emphasis).
124. [2017] UKSC 5.
125. [2017] UKSC 5, para 45.
126. [2013] IEHC 226.
127. At para 23 Hogan J observed that'this would plainly violate Article 15.2.1' and
added that the High Court had reached a similar conclusion in Duggan v An
Taoiseach [1989] ILRM 720. Hogan J noted that in Duggan Hamilton P held that
a government instruction to suspend the operation of the Farm Tax Act 1985
was unlawful. In describing the role of the executive, Hamilton P adopted the
terminology of the'Take Care'clause of the United States Constitution, observ-
ing that it was incumbent on the executive to 'take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed. Similarly, in Hoey v Minister for Agriculture [1998] 1 IR 539, the
court held that'It is not open to the Executive by arrangements made with the
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NHV v Minister for Justice and Equality.128 This case concerned inter alia a consti-
tutional challenge to provisions of the Refugee Act 1996, which constituted an
indefinite statutory ban on access to the labour market for international protec-
tion applicants. Hogan J began by acknowledging the inherent power vested in
the executive to admit non-nationals into the State on conditions which might
include the right to enter the labour market. 12 9 However, Hogan J observed
that this area of policy was regulated by the Oireachtas through the provisions
of the Refugee Act 1996, as amended. Hogan J asserted that the Minister for
Justice could not rely on inherent executive power to grant the applicant a per-
mission to enter the labour market in a manner contrary to statute. He held that
where the Oireachtas has legislated on a particular topic in a 'manner which
(either expressly or impliedly) precludes the exercise of any ministerial discre-
tion in relation to that issue, the executive power cannot be exercised in a man-
ner which would override that legislative prohibition 130 The court considered
that if the executive were permitted to do otherwise it would effectively replace
its traditional role as faithful executor of the law 131 with that of law-maker, con-
trary to the exclusive power vested in the Oireachtas by Article 15.132 In Farrell
v Governor of Portlaoise Prison133 Hogan J considered a challenge to a refusal
local authority ... to relieve such local authority from the obligations expressly
imposed on it by statute ... if the Executive wishes to limit or reduce such obliga-
tions, the Executive must introduce the appropriate legislation.'
128. [2016] IECA 86. It should be noted that although Hogan J was in dissent in this
case, the majority of the court expressly adopted his reasoning on the inability of
the executive to unilaterally suspend the intention of a statute. Finlay Geoghegan
J held, at para 6, that'I have had the opportunity of reading in draft the judgment
of Hogan J ... I am in agreement with his conclusions and reasons therefor on all
issues, other than his conclusion that the appellant has a right to work or earn a
livelihood protected by Article 40.3 and his consequential conclusion that s. 9(4)(b)
of the 1996 Act is repugnant to the Constitution!
129. [2016] IECA 86, para 24.
130. [2016] IECA 86.
131. Alexander Hamilton concisely elucidated this demarcation in the Federalist papers
during the ratification debates, observing that 'the essence of the legislative
authority is to enact laws, or, in other words to prescribe rules for the regulation of
the society. While the execution of the laws and the employment of the common
strength, either for this purpose or for the common defence, seem to comprise all
the functions of the executive magistrate': Alexander Hamilton,'The TreatyMaking
Power of the Executive' The Federalist Papers No. 75. Accessed at https://www.
congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers; on 20 May 2016.
132. Hogan J reached a similar conclusion in CopymoorevMinister for Public Works [2013]
IEHC 230, where he held that while a Minister can exercise the executive power of
the State in Article 28.2 of the Constitution in order to give general directions to the
public sector by means of circular, a circular may not alter or vary the general law
nor compromise rights or entitlements deriving from European Union law.
133. [2014] IEHC 392.
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to grant remission to a prisoner. Hogan J said that there was 'no doubt at all
but that the power to remit a sentence is entirely an executive function' but
that the fact Article 13.6134 envisages that the power can be conferred by law
on other authorities also'tacitly implies that the exercise of this power can be
regulated by law'13. Hogan J went on to note that as statutory provisions had
been made pursuant to Article 13.6, the executive power to remit was accord-
ingly'not a free-standing one, such as would obtain if there were no provisions
dealing with remission in the Prison Rules'136 Consequently, Hogan J held that
that in any challenge to the exercise of that power, the issue becomes whether
the power has been exercised in a manner compatible with that particular stat-
ute. Doyle and Feldman suggest that Hogan J's dicta reflects the way in which
the'executive power - unlike the judicial and legislative powers - is subject to
control by another organ of government'137 The recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in NHVechoed Hogan J's theoretical approach to the relationship between
inherent executive power and statutory regulation. Writing for a unanimous
court, O'Donnell J noted that such power could not be operated to unilaterally
'effect the repeal or amendment of ... legislation"13 1 O'Donnell J observed that
it was a longstanding aspect of English constitutional law, dating to the historic
decision in Crown Proclamations, that the 'royal prerogative did not extend to
the repealing or overriding of legislation"13 1 O'Donnell J went on to assert that
the same'must be capable of being said, a fortiori, of the executive power in a
constitution which recognises the separation of powers. 14 0
Part IV. Summary of the Core Principles of this Emerging
Body of Law and Some Unanswered Questions
The foregoing suggests that a relatively coherent jurisprudence is emerging in
relation to non-statutory exercises of inherent executive power.The core princi-
ples from these cases can be outlined in simple terms as follows:
(i) The executive is not precluded from promulgating policies and non-
statutory executive schemes in the absence of legislation. Where the
courts have upheld these non-statutory executive schemes, the policy
has often been construed as the conferral of a'benefit'by the executive;
134. Article 13.6 of the Constitution states:'The right of pardon and the power to com-
mute or remit punishment imposed by any court exercising criminal jurisdiction
are hereby vested in the President, but such power of commutation or remission
may also be conferred by law on other authorities!
135. [2014] IEHC 392, para 16.
136. [2014] IEHC 392, para 16.
137. Oran Doyle and Estelle Feldman,'ConstitutionalLaw'in Raymond Byrne and William
Binchy (eds), TheAnnual Reviewof Irish Law (Round Hall 2014), at 141.
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(ii) The executive cannot exercise its inherent authority to unilaterally
impose or change legal rights and obligations absent statutory author-
ity, nor can it reduce personal rights. This is often described by aca-
demic and judicial authority as a prohibition on the executive imposing
'burdens and obligations.The ability to impose burdens and obligations
is reserved to the Oireachtas exercising its exclusive legislative power;
(iii) The executive cannot unilaterally disapply or frustrate a statute;
(iv) There are areas of policy which are considered to spatially fall into the
concept of inherent executive power, conspicuous among these areas
being the power to regulate and control immigration;
(v) However, these powers in an effective reverse of the proposition at (iii),
can be seized by the Oireachtas. Whatever inherent executive powers
exist are capable of being effectively'ousted'by legislation. Once the leg-
islature chooses to populate the field occupied by an inherent executive
power, the latter is effectively extinguished and the executive is bound
by the statute and can only govern that area under legislative sanction.
As noted at the beginning of this article, I suggested that difficult questions
remain over the boundaries of inherent executive power and the foregoing prin-
ciples limiting same.These include (i) the circumstances in which an exercise of
executive power can be construed as constituting a burden or obligation which
properly requires legislation; (ii) the related question of what factors which dis-
tinguish between the creation of non-statutory executive-power-based rules
and policy and the promulgation of legislation, the latter of which is exclusively
vested in the Oireachtas; and (iii) whether the executive enjoys an exclusive con-
stitutional domain over any areas of policy, which cannot be lawfully colonised
by the legislature. The final part of this article offers tentative observations on
each of these under-explored questions.
In relation to the first question, the courts have held that while an executive
scheme may affect fundamental rights, such as family rights, the right to priva-
cy,141 and the right to primary education, it may not create burdens or obliga-
tions, nor reduce personal rights. The conceptual demarcation between these
propositions is a fine one, and appears to depend on the exact nature of how
the proposed executive policy affects personal rights, and the extent to which
the scheme can be said to create new legal obligations or reduce the scope
of existing rights. However, this appears to leave room for executive schemes
which can regulate the exercise of fundamental rights without any statutory
basis. Moreover, and although not expressly addressed by the superior courts,
the case law concerning executive power and immigration raise other difficult
questions. For example, there is a clear tension between the proposition that
the executive enjoys an extensive power to regulate the entry and residence
of aliens in the absence of statute, and the proposition that the executive may




not impose burdens and obligations on persons in the absence of legislation.
While the entry, residence, and deportation of aliens is subject to heavy statu-
tory regulation, the courts have said that these powers can be exercised in the
absence of legislative authority. However, the non-statutory use of executive
power to regulate the conditions of residence, employment and even deporta-
tion of aliens would appear to constitute the active imposition of burdens on
any number of constitutional or convention rights.142 Indeed, it is arguable that
such an extensive exercise of executive power would amount in substance to
legislative measures, which are textually vested in the Oireachtas in prima facie
absolutist terms.
Linked to this is the second question posed above. That is, if only a "law"
passed by the Oireachtas can impose an obligation or a burden on a person's
personal rights, how are we to distinguish a "law" from a non-statutory execu-
tive policy or scheme? This question raises difficulties similar to those inherent
in trying to establish a coherent boundary between (i) the legislature's constitu-
tionally permissible ability to delegate subordinate administrative authority, and
(ii) the prima facie absolute constitutional prohibition on delegated law-making
authority. In both instances, it seems that before we can attempt to map these
sensitive constitutional boundaries, we must first be armed with an understand-
ing of what constitutes a 'law' for the purposes of Article 15. Doyle plausibly
suggests that we might adopt the position that 'legislation distinctively consists
of general rules applicable to classes of people that bind (or implicitly claim to
bind) their behaviour. Legislatures can legislate in a way that directly affects the
rights and obligations of people. 143 As noted above, there is support for this prop-
osition from the history of Anglo-American legal thought and from the text of
Article 28.2, that the formation of generally applicable rules of private conduct
represents the hallmark of a legislative measure. However, for the moment it
remains to be seen whether future case law will yield engagement in relation to
demarcating these boundaries between executive-policy-based schemes/regu-
lations and what may be, in effect, legislative measures.
Decisions demarcating the boundaries of inherent executive power will
obviously have important constitutional consequences. As I discussed at the
outset, even in a Westminster-style parliamentary system which fuses execu-
tive and legislative personnel, the legislature retains an element of oversight
and contestatory power via the law-making process. Many commentators
are rightly sceptical of the strength of the contestatory power the Oireachtas
has as against a typically domineering executive. However, a convincing
142. By way of example, family rights under Article 8 and Article 41 of the Convention
and Constitution respectively. The High Court in Gorry vMinister for Justice [2014]
IEHC 29 held that:'an Irish national married to a non-Irish national has a constitu-
tional right to reside in Ireland with that other person, subject to lawful regulation.
The right is not absolute.'
143. Oran Doyle and Estelle Feldman,'ConstitutionalLaw'in Raymond Byrne and William
Binchy (eds), The Annual Reviewof Irish Law (Round Hall, 2013), at 142.
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case can be made that regardless of this fusion, a measure of parliamentary
involvement and oversight is preferable to none when it comes to the prom-
ulgation of consequential policies. While the relationship between legislative
and executive authority will vary with 'constitutional arrangements, proce-
dural norms and politico-administrative cultures, 144 at its best parliament
retains an essential role in ensuring that the work of government is exposed
to greater contestation, deliberation and participation. While sceptical of the
current robustness of parliamentary contestatory power, Daly and Hickey
correctly highlight that parliament is the primary mechanism of account-
ability where'citizens can be heard such that the laws and policies' 145 of the
government will be more likely to reflect their interests. Parliament in Ireland
remains, for all its current weakness, an 'institutional source of pressure
through which government'is forced to'publicly justify its laws and policies,
showing them to serve the public interest'. 14 6
Even if a government can command a reliable majority, the foregoing val-
ues of contestation, participation and deliberation are instantiated to a greater
degree than if a relevant policy is crafted and promulgated by civil servants
and executive-branch lawyers, without having been exposed to any parliamen-
tary scrutiny. Consequently, we might be wary of countenancing parliaments'
frequent circumvention through broad reliance on unenumerated executive
power.That is not to say that the'integrity branches'of government, comprised
of innovative institutions such as Ombudsmen, Freedom of Information Officers
and Human Rights Commissions, do not have an important role to play as sup-
plementary or forms of executive oversight. Instead, this suggestion is based on
a recognition that while the foregoing play a useful parallel role, the core dem-
ocratic value of facilitating 'ongoing scrutiny and accountability of government
in a representative public forum' 14 7 becomes diluted if the legislative process
can be easily short-circuited. Legitimating broad conceptions of unenumerated
executive powers to promulgate policies undermines the extent to which those
who wield power must'answer openly, under the public glare ... such that citi-
zens can see themselves as controlling those who control them'on an ongoing
basis. 148 Therefore, there is a risk an over-broad concept of inherent executive
power could weaken the already limited institutional checks on the executive
provided by parliament, which may only further exacerbate the phenomenon
of executive dominance. The foregoing questions then belie tensions in the
principles articulated by the court and raise the further question of whether it is
144. Muiris MacCarthaigh, 'The Role of the Houses of the Oireachtas: Theory and
Practice' in Muiris MacCarthaigh and Maurice Manning (eds), The Houses of the
Oireachtas: Parliamentin Ireland (Institute of Public Administration 2010), at 48.
145. Eoin DalyandTom Hickey, The Political Theoryofthelrish Constitution:Republicanism
and the Basic Law (Manchester University Press 2015), at 99.
146. ibid.
147. ibid, at 107.
148. ibid, at 108.
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desirable to construe the permissible parameters of inherent executive power
in a broad fashion. For those already critical of executive dominance in the Irish
constitutional order, a judicial trend toward recognising a broad residuum of
executive power would represent an unwelcome development.
In relation to the third question, O'Donnell J has pointed out that since the
ratification of the 1937 Constitution there has never been a constitutional case
involving adjudication on the claim that the Oireachtas had unconstitutionally
encroached upon the executive powers of the government. While this issue
has given rise to heated academic debate in constitutional systems such as
the United States, it has not given rise to controversy in Ireland. 149 O'Donnell
J writes:
It has never been asserted that there is an area of core activity which is reserved
exclusively for the executive ... Up until today at least, it appears that there are no
theoretical limits to the extent to which the powers previously exercised by the executive
can be made the subject of legislation. 15
The dicta of cases such as Laurentiu, NHVand Farrell arguably lend weight to
this hypothetical proposition and hint at the approach an Irish court might
take to such a question. This dicta suggests that: (i) the executive may exer-
cise any inherent power it enjoys in a free-standing way, absent statutory
warrant;"' and (ii) the legislature may effectively colonise this inherent power,
ensuring that the government must comply with statutory prescriptions.
A concrete and current example is whether the government retains discretion,
notwithstanding the provisions of the Immigration Act 2004, to grant entry
and residence permissions to non-EEA nationals. As noted above, this ques-
tion has received conflicting answers in the superior courts and has yet to be
conclusively resolved. Writing extra-judicially, O'Donnell J observes that if the
149. For example, the heated debate over whether congressional regulation of the
President's use of military force represented an unconstitutional fettering of
the President's role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces under Article II
Section 2 of the United States Constitution: Janet Cooper Alexander,'John Yoo's War
Powers: The Law Review and the World'(2012) 100 California Law Review 331, 334.
The Library of Congress entry for the term'War Powers'states that'U.S. Presidents
have consistently taken the position that the War Powers Resolution is an uncon-
stitutional infringement upon the power of the executive branch. As a result,
the Resolution has been the subject of controversy since its enactment, and is a
recurring issue due to the ongoing worldwide commitment of U.S. armed forces':
<https://www.loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php> accessed 20 May 2016.
150. My emphasis. O'Donnell J added the following caveat:'I am not here suggesting
there is no such area. It is sufficient to observe that in almost a century of consti-
tutionalism, this issue does not appear to have arisen': 'Some Reflections on the
Independence of the Judiciary in Ireland in 21st Century Europe' (2016) Trinity
College Law Review 10.
151. Subject, of course, to other constitutional constraints.
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government does not retain any residual power to grant permission to be or
remain in the State, then 'it would seem that an area hitherto seen as a clas-
sic executive power has been entirely supplanted by legislation'. 15 2 Therefore,
while there is authority for the proposition that the Oireachtas may colonise
and regulate inherent executive power, the fascinating reverse question of
whether there are areas of inherent executive activity, beyond regulation by
the Oireachtas, remains to be decided.
The ultimate answer to the foregoing may well break into new constitutional
terrain, and yield some concrete answers to the currently hypothetical ques-
tions raised. No matter what answers are provided, I suggest that the questions
posed above amply demonstrate that after 80 years Bunreacht na hiireann
remains a document filled with fascinating under-explored corners - even in
respect of fundamental questions of constitutional law. In the years ahead,
then, our basic law remains eminently worthy and in need of continued consid-
eration, engagement, and exploration.
152. The Hon Mr Justice Donal O'Donnell,'Some Reflections on the Independence of the
Judiciary in Ireland in 21st Century Europe' (2016) Trinity College Law Review 1, 11.
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